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I. INTRODUCTION
Liberty and equality have always had a complex interrelationship. Liberty
protects individual choice, while equality protects individuals from discrimination
based on statuses about which they have no choice. Examining liberty and equality
in the context of parent-child relationships adds an additional layer of complexity.
When a woman exercises her liberty to procreate by using her deceased husband’s
genetic material, her children may experience inequality due to their status as
posthumously conceived.1 Such children are, in some states, denied Social Security
survivors benefits because their deceased genetic parent is not viewed as their legal
parent.2 This was the case with Karen Capato’s twins, who were conceived using her
deceased husband’s sperm and subsequently denied the survivors benefits that their


Professor of Law, University of Toledo College of Law. I would like to thank Professors
Susan Martyn, Rebecca Zietlow, Kelly Moore, Kara Bruce, and Shelley Cavalieri for their
helpful comments during the drafting of this essay. I would also, as always, like to thank Mike
Loegering for his encouragement, wisdom, and love.
1

These are, of course, not the only liberty and equality considerations that exist within
the context of parent-child relationships. I have illustrated elsewhere that the two rights
always have multiple dimensions, such that parents have equality interests and children have
liberty interests. Jessica Knouse, Reconciling Liberty and Equality in the Debate over
Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis, 2013 UTAH L. REV. (forthcoming 2013). This essay,
however, focuses on the liberty interests of parents and the equality interests of children as
they operate within the context of posthumous conception.
2

Astrue v. Capato, 132 S. Ct. 2021 (2012).

9
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older (non-posthumously conceived) brother was able to receive because their
genetic father was not viewed as their legal parent.3 When Karen Capato’s case
reached the Supreme Court in 2012, her equal protection arguments were rejected
and survivors benefits were withheld on the basis that the twins were not Robert
Capato’s “children.”4
This essay uses Astrue v. Capato as a platform to examine how liberty and
equality interact within parent-child relationships. It observes that as prospective
parents have experienced an increase in liberty due to new reproductive technologies
the children they create have not necessarily experienced a commensurate increase in
equality. The law’s myopic focus on parent-child relationships rather than providerdependent relationships renders posthumously conceived children unequal along
multiple dimensions. They may have not only one provider, but also only one
parent.5 This essay argues that shifting the law’s focus away from identifying parents
and towards identifying providers would mitigate the status inequality that
posthumously conceived children currently experience without (necessarily) altering
the allocation of benefits. The Capato case would have had a very different legacy if,
instead of determining whether the twins were Robert Capato’s “children,”6 the
Social Security Administration had simply determined whether they were his
“dependents.” This proposal fits with recent challenges to traditional notions of
parentage.7
Part II provides background information. It describes the current law with respect
to the parentage of posthumously conceived children and offers a detailed account of
Astrue v. Capato.8 Part III considers the liberty and equality implications of
posthumous conception. It addresses the doctrinal as well as practical aspects of
liberty and equality and observes that, while prospective parents have substantial
liberty to elect posthumous conception, the children they create may experience
inequality associated with their status as posthumously conceived—in part, because
they may have only one legal parent. Part IV suggests a diminution in the law’s
focus on parentage. It argues that the law should focus less on parent-child
relationships and more on provider-dependent relationships by, for example,
eliminating the use of parental status as a proxy for provider status under the Social
Security Act. Part V concludes that this shift in focus from parental status to
provider status would protect the liberty of adults, promote the equality of children,
and perhaps achieve a more just distribution of governmental benefits.
3

Id. at 2023, 2034.

4

Id. at 2033–34.

5

As Part III(B) will discuss, posthumously conceived children are also a subset of nonmarital children. Marital status discrimination is, however—for purposes of this essay—only a
secondary consideration. See infra Part III(B). This is, in part, because I have argued
elsewhere that civil marriage should be abolished. Jessica Knouse, Civil Marriage: Threat to
Democracy, 18 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 361 (2012). Rather than reiterating my previous
arguments, I will simply note that abolishing civil marriage would be my preferred means of
creating equality between marital and non-marital children.
6

Capato, 132 S. Ct. at 2027–34.

7

See, e.g., Susan Frelich Appleton, Parents by the Numbers, 37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 11, 12
(2008).
8

Capato, 132 S. Ct. at 2021.
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II. UNDERSTANDING POSTHUMOUS CONCEPTION
Part II describes the current law with respect to the parentage of posthumously
conceived children. It focuses on whether a deceased gamete-provider can be viewed
as a legal parent. Part II(a) offers a brief overview of existing state statutes, and Part
II(b) provides a detailed account of Astrue v. Capato.
A. Posthumous Conception and Legal Parentage
Posthumous conception can occur through at least two mechanisms. It can be
accomplished using genetic material—a sperm, an egg, or an embryo—that was
cryopreserved during an individual’s lifetime to allow for the possibility of future
parenthood,9 or it can be accomplished using genetic material that was harvested
after an individual’s death at the request of a survivor.10 The former mechanism is
the more common at present,11 and one can imagine a variety of reasons that a living
individual might elect to cryopreserve his or her genetic material, including concerns
about infertility resulting from medical treatment (e.g., chemotherapy), exposure to
toxins or other dangers (e.g., in the course of combat), or normal aging processes.12
One of the primary legal issues arising from posthumous conception is parentage,
yet at present less than one-third of the states have statutes addressing whether
deceased gamete-providers should be viewed as the parents of posthumously
conceived children.13 Many of the states that do have statutes have embraced policies
similar to Section 707 of the Uniform Parentage Act,14 which provides:
If an individual who consented in a record to be a parent by assisted
reproduction dies before placement of eggs, sperm, or embryos, the
deceased individual is not a parent of the resulting child unless the
deceased spouse consented in a record that if assisted reproduction were
to occur after death, the deceased individual would be a parent of the
child.15
9

Katheryn Katz, Parenthood from the Grave. 2006 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 289, 292 (2006). As
Professor Judith Daar has written, “Birth after death can be accomplished by freezing sperm,
eggs, or embryos when they are viable, maintaining them in a frozen state in a manner that
preserves their structure and function, and thawing the material so as to restore their capacity
to become a new human being.” JUDITH DAAR, REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES AND THE LAW
522 (2d ed. 2013).
10

Katz, supra note 9 (“[I]t is possible to retrieve gametes from individuals who are
deceased, brain dead, comatose, or in a persistent vegetative state (“PVS”) for use in
procreation by the recipient.”). Professor Judith Daar writes, “[m]ore than a handful of births
have been reported using sperm retrieved from a man who has been declared dead, and while
there are no verified reports of postmortem egg retrieval and birth, no technophile can doubt
this possibility is on the horizon.” DAAR, supra note 9.
11

DAAR, supra note 9 (“Currently the vast majority of gametes are retrieved while the
progenitor is still alive . . .”).
12

Browne Lewis, Graveside Birthday Parties: The Legal Consequences of Forming
Families Posthumously, 60 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1159, 1170, 1173–74 (2010).
13
DAAR, supra note 9. Another legal issue that often arises is inheritance rights. Lewis,
supra note 12, at 1179–81.
14
15

DAAR, supra note 9, at 562.
Unif. Parentage Act § 707 (2000) (amended 2002).
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Under such statutes, whether a deceased gamete-provider will be viewed as a parent
depends upon whether he or she specifically consented to be the parent of a child
who was conceived and born after his or her death.
Some state statutes, rather than speaking directly to parentage, speak to
inheritance rights—i.e., to whether a child can inherit from a gamete-provider whose
death preceded his or her conception. In Florida, for example, where the Capato case
occurred, a posthumously conceived child is statutorily barred from inheriting from a
deceased gamete-provider unless he or she was expressly provided for by will.16
Florida’s intestacy statute provides, in relevant part, “[a] child conceived from the . .
. sperm of a person . . . who died before the transfer of their . . . sperm . . . to a
woman’s body shall not be eligible for a claim against the decedent’s estate unless
the child has been provided for by the decedent’s will.”17 While this language does
not speak directly to parentage, it influences parentage when read in conjunction
with the Social Security Act. As Part II(b) will explain, since the Social Security
Administration looks to state intestacy law to determine whether an applicant for
survivors benefits is the “child” of a deceased insured wage earner, state intestacy
statutes effectively determine parentage. The fact that so few states have statutes
addressing the parentage of posthumously conceived children has left governmental
entities with little guidance. This essay, acknowledging the lack of legislative
guidance, asks whether and to what extent governmental entities ought to be using
parent-child relationships as proxies for provider-dependent relationships.
B. Astrue v. Capato
This subsection describes the facts and analysis of Astrue v. Capato in order to
illustrate how an adult’s exercise of procreative liberty—i.e., the decision to engage
in posthumous conception—could cause the resulting children to experience
inequality. Karen Capato’s posthumously conceived twins experienced inequality, in
part, because they had only one legal parent, while their non-posthumously
conceived genetic sibling had two legal parents.18 It should be noted at the outset that
this subsection merely describes the Court’s reasoning, while Part III(b) provides a
more in-depth analysis of the equal protection issues raised by posthumous
conception.
Shortly after Karen and Robert Capato were married, Robert was diagnosed with
esophageal cancer.19 Because he was advised that the treatment (chemotherapy)
might render him sterile, Robert had some of his sperm frozen and banked.20 The
Capatos, however, conceived naturally and had a son whom they hoped would one
16
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.17(4) (West 2013) (“A child conceived from the eggs or sperm
of a person or persons who died before the transfer of their eggs, sperm, or preembryos to a
woman's body shall not be eligible for a claim against the decedent's estate unless the child
has been provided for by the decedent's will.”).
17

Id.

18
Although the Social Security Act focuses on whether someone is a deceased insured
wage earner’s “child” rather than whether the deceased insured wage earner is a “parent,” the
inquiry is substantially the same since one generally cannot be the “child” of someone without
that person being their “parent.” Astrue v. Capato, 132 S. Ct. 2021, 2027 (2012).
19

Id. at 2026.

20

Id.
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day have a sibling.21 Robert’s will provided for his and Karen’s son as well as for
two children from a prior marriage.22 Although Robert and Karen told their attorney
that they wanted any future children to be treated the same as any existing children,
Robert’s will did not make any provision for future children.23 When Robert’s and
Karen’s son was about seven months old, Robert passed away.24 Robert’s banked
sperm, however, remained viable and was used by Karen to conceive twins who
were born eighteen months after Robert’s death.25
When Karen applied for Social Security survivor’s benefits for the twins the
Social Security Administration (“SSA”) denied her application on the basis that the
twins were not Robert’s “children.”26 The Social Security Act, which generally
speaking is designed to provide “dependent members of [a wage earner’s] family
with protection against . . . the loss of [the insured’s] earnings,”27 defines the term
“child” in two relevant sections.28 Section 416(e), which provided the basis for
Karen’s argument, states, “‘[C]hild means (1) the child or legally adopted child of an
individual[.]”29 Section 416(h)(2)(A), which provided the basis for the SSA’s
argument, states, “In determining whether an applicant is the child . . . of [an]
insured wage earner[,] the Commissioner of Social Security shall apply [the
intestacy law of the insured individual’s domiciliary State].”30 Robert had been
domiciled in the State of Florida, which, as discussed in Part II(a), does not allow
posthumously conceived children to take through intestacy.31
The district court accepted the SSA’s argument, but the Third Circuit accepted
Karen’s argument and reversed, observing that the twins were “‘the undisputed
biological children of a deceased wage earner and his widow.’”32 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari, likely because the four courts of appeal that had spoken were

21

Id.

22

Id.

23

Id.

24

Id.

25

Id.

26

Id.

27

Id. at 2032 (“The aim was not to create a program ‘generally benefiting needy persons’;
it was, more particularly, to ‘provide . . . dependent members of [a wage earner’s] family with
protection against the hardship occasioned by [the] loss of [the insured's] earnings.’”) (quoting
Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47, 52 (1977)).
28

Id. at 2027–28; 42 U.S.C. § 416(e), (h)(2)(A) (2004).

29

Capato, 132 S. Ct. at 2027; 42 U.S.C. § 416(e) (2004).

30

Capato, 132 S. Ct. at 2028; 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(2)(A) (2004). While other sub-sections
within §416(h) provide alternative definitions, they were not invoked in this litigation.
Capato, 132 S. Ct. at 2028, n.5.
31

Capato, 132 S. Ct. at 2026. Florida’s intestacy statute is discussed in greater detail
above in Part II(A). See infra Part II(A).
32
Capato, 132 S. Ct. at 2027 (citing Capato v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 31 F. 3d 626, 631
(2011)).
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evenly split in their interpretations of the Social Security Act.33 The Third and Ninth
Circuits, applying §416(e), had both granted benefits because the children’s
biological parentage was undisputed, whereas the Fourth and Eighth Circuits,
applying §416(h)(2)(A), had both denied benefits because the children could not take
under state intestacy law.34 The Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion authored by
Justice Ginsburg, agreed with the Fourth and Eighth Circuits that §416(h)(2)(A)
controlled, and held that, because the twins were not Robert’s “children” under
Florida’s intestacy law, the SSA had properly denied them survivors benefits.35
Although Karen raised an equal protection argument, claiming that using
§416(h)(2)(A) in such a manner unlawfully discriminated against posthumously
conceived children—not least, in the sense that Karen’s non-posthumously
conceived son was able to receive survivors benefits while her posthumously
conceived twins were not36—the Supreme Court rejected her argument without much
discussion.37 The Court acknowledged that laws targeting non-marital children have
traditionally received intermediate scrutiny, in part, because of the unfairness of
punishing children for the acts of their parents.38 But it found there had been no
showing that laws targeting posthumously conceived children merit similarly
heightened scrutiny.39 It thus applied rational basis review and upheld the use of
§416(h)(2)(A), even in cases where biological parentage is undisputed.40 The Court
held that looking to state intestacy law to determine parentage was rationally related
to two legitimate governmental interests: first, conserving benefits for children who
have actually lost a parent’s support, and second, avoiding the need for
individualized inquiries into dependency.41 As previously mentioned, the equal
protection issues raised by posthumous conception will be discussed further in Part
III(B).
III. IMPLICATIONS OF POSTHUMOUS CONCEPTION
Part III illustrates that as prospective parents have experienced an increase in
liberty due to new reproductive technologies their children have not necessarily
experienced a commensurate increase in equality. Karen Capato’s exercise of
liberty—i.e., her decision to use her late husband’s sperm to conceive—impacted her
children’s equality under existing legal parentage regimes. There was even
inequality among Karen’s own three children. The oldest, born before his father’s
death, had two legal parents and was thus entitled to survivors benefits; while the
33

Id. at 2007.

34

Id. (citing Capato v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 626, 631 (2011); Gillett-Netting v.
Barnhart, 371 F.3d 593, 596–97 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004); Beeler v. Astrue, 651 F.3d 954, 960–64
(Cal. Ct. App. 2011); Schafer v. Astrue, 641 F.3d 49, 54–63 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011)).
35

See generally Capato, 132 S. Ct. at 2021.

36

Id. at 2021, 2032–33.

37

Id. at 2033.

38

Id. (citing Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988)).

39

Id. at 2033.

40

Id.

41

Id.
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twins, conceived and born after their father’s death, had only one legal parent (their
mother) and were therefore denied survivors benefits.42 Part III(a) addresses the
liberty of adults who wish to engage in posthumous conception, and Part III(b)
addresses the equality of children born through posthumous conception.
A. Liberty Rights of Prospective Posthumous Conceivers
Liberty has both doctrinal and practical definitions, and this section begins by
focusing on its doctrinal definitions. To that end, it provides a brief overview of
Supreme Court cases involving the right to procreate and considers whether that
right extends to procreation by means of posthumous conception. Assuming that the
right could extend to procreation by means of posthumous conception, this section
then considers who might be able to invoke the right—e.g., a surviving prospective
parent or deceased gamete-provider (through his or her legal representative). This
section concludes with a brief discussion of liberty’s more practical definitions and
observes that—whatever its formal doctrinal dimensions—the paucity of legal
regulations surrounding reproductive technologies has conferred substantial practical
liberty on those who wish to engage in posthumous conception.
The Due Process Clauses of the 5th and 14th Amendments have historically
protected the liberty to make decisions about procreation.43 While the Supreme Court
has never in the context of a due process decision directly recognized the right to
procreate, it has on numerous occasions recognized the right not to procreate—often
framing it as a right to decide “whether to bear or beget a child.”44 Furthermore, in a
1942 opinion focusing on equal protection the Court described procreation as
“fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race” and as a “basic civil
right.”45 While recent cases have called into question whether procreative liberty
remains a “fundamental” liberty,46 this essay proceeds from the premise that it
continues to exist in at least some limited form.47
Assuming that procreative liberty continues to exist, it is not at all clear whether
it extends to encompass non-coital—much less posthumous—conception.
Historically, the test of whether a given liberty was “fundamental” and thus triggered
“strict scrutiny” involved framing the liberty “careful[ly],”48 and asking whether it
42

Capato ex rel. B.N.C. v. Comm'r Soc. Sec., No. 10-2027, 2013 WL 3814947 *1 (3d Cir.
July 24, 2013).
43

U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV (preventing the government from depriving “any person
of . . . liberty . . . without due process of law”); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972);
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 179, 212–13 (1973); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833, 851 (1992).
44

Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453; Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 170; Casey, 505 U.S. at 851.

45

Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).

46

Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007).

47

As recently as 2003, the Supreme Court referred to the existence of a right to decide
“whether to bear or beget a child.” Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 565 (2003). Gonzales v.
Carhart, in 2007, did not directly repudiate this statement, though it (as mentioned) did call it
into question. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124.
48
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) (“[W]e have required in
substantive-due-process cases a ‘careful description’ of the asserted fundamental liberty
interest.”). By “carefully,” the Court appears to mean “narrowly.”
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was “deeply rooted in our nation’s history and tradition” and “‘implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty,’ such that ‘neither liberty nor justice would exist if [it
was] sacrificed.’”49 Under such a test, posthumous conception would most likely not
be viewed as a “fundamental” liberty, since it was not technologically possible for
most of our nation’s history. In a 2003 case, however, rather than asking whether the
liberty at issue was consistent with existing traditions, the Court observed that it was
consistent with “emerging” traditions and proceeded to apply what might be
described as “a more searching form of rational basis review.”50 Under such a
standard, laws burdening posthumous conception could potentially receive
something more than regular rational basis review.
Regardless of the specific status of the liberty or the specific level of scrutiny, it
is unclear who might invoke a right to posthumous conception if it were protected by
the Due Process Clauses. There are least two possible scenarios. First, a decedent’s
representative might argue that the decedent retains a constitutional liberty right to
decide whether his or her gametes should be used for posthumous conception.51
Second, a surviving spouse, partner, parent, or other interested individual might
argue that they have a constitutional liberty right to use the decedent’s gametes to
engage in posthumous conception.
With respect to the first scenario, a decedent most likely does not have a
constitutional liberty right to decide whether his or her gametes will be used for
posthumous conception.52 While some might argue otherwise53—reasoning, in part,
49

Id. at 720–21. If the liberty was “fundamental,” laws that burdened it received strict
scrutiny; if not, they received rational basis review.
50
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571–72 (analyzing Texas’s same-sex sodomy ban and stating the
following: “[W]e think that our laws and traditions in the past half century are of most
relevance here. [They] show an emerging awareness that liberty gives substantial protection to
adult persons in deciding how to conduct their private lives in matters pertaining to sex.
‘[H]istory and tradition are the starting point but not in all cases the ending point of the
substantive due process inquiry.’”) (internal citations omitted). The description of the level of
scrutiny as “a more searching form of rational basis review” derives in part from Justice
O’Connor’s concurrence in Lawrence. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 580 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
While Justice O’Connor was writing about the Equal Protection rather than Due Process
Clause, one could argue that the majority’s due-process-based decision applied a similarly
heightened form of rational basis review.
51
While some have explored the debate over what should occur when the decedent was
silent with respect to his or her wishes, this essay sets that scenario aside and focuses on cases
in which the decedent clearly expressed his or her wishes. This is most common in situations
where the decedent cryopreserved his or her genetic material during his or her lifetime and
was directly asked to contemplate the possibility of posthumous conception.
52

See John Robertson, Posthumous Reproduction, 69 IND. L.J. 1027, 1041–42 (1994)
(“Even if the Court found that noncoital reproduction was protected [as a fundamental
constitutional right], decisions about posthumous reproduction are so far removed from [the]
interests [motivating non-posthumous reproduction] that it is highly unlikely that a
fundamental constitutional right would be found.”).
53
Professor Anne Reichman Schiff, for example, has written, “the right to avoid becoming
a biological parent should generally be respected after death as it is in life, and . . . infringing
upon this interest constitutes a serious violation of an individual’s procreative liberty.” Anne
Reichman Schiff, Arising from the Dead: Challenges of Posthumous Procreation, 75 N.C. L.
REV. 901, 908 (1997). Professor Kathryn Katz has similarly written, “The dead are not usually
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that one’s liberty to make decisions about procreation should endure so long as his or
her genetic material remains viable—such arguments ignore the close connection
between procreative rights and parental rights.54 The liberty to make procreative
decisions is closely tied to the liberty to make parenting decisions, and the dead can
neither enjoy the rights nor carry out the responsibilities of parenthood. As Professor
John Robertson wrote in his seminal article titled Posthumous Reproduction, “The
interest in controlling reproductive events that will not occur until after one is dead is
simply too attenuated a version of the important interests that one has in controlling
reproduction while alive to warrant constitutional protection.”55 The decedent,
therefore, most likely does not have a constitutional liberty right to make decisions
about posthumous conception.56
It should, as an aside, be noted that the decedent may potentially assert a property
right created by state law that would afford him or her some control over the
disposition of his or her gametes. Decedents are generally able to exercise control
over the disposition of their organs and tissue57 and, while gametes may be viewed as
quite different from organs and tissue,58 decedents have in some cases been allowed
to transfer vials of sperm by will.59 Further discussion of the decedent’s potential
property right is beyond the scope of this essay.
With respect to the second scenario, a surviving spouse, partner, parent, or other
interested individual might argue that they have a constitutional liberty right to use
the decedent’s gametes to engage in posthumous conception.60 Although living
persons clearly have procreative liberty, that liberty does not encompass the use of
another person’s gametes.61 As Professor Katheryn Katz observed in her 2006 article
titled Parenthood from the Grave, the right “to procreate with a partner of one’s
thought of as having rights that survive death, but . . . procreative rights are exceptional.”
Katz, supra note 9.
54
The Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments protect not only
procreative rights but also parental rights. See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923);
Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925), Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
55

Robertson, supra note 52, at 1042. Professor Robertson continues, “This is true both for
engaging in posthumous reproduction and for avoiding posthumous reproduction.” Robertson,
supra note 52, at 1042.
56

It should be noted that states may give deference to decedent’s wishes, and that this
article is only addressing the issue of whether the decedent has a constitutional liberty right.
57

See, e.g., UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 8 (amended 2008) (providing that, if the
decedent’s wishes with respect to organ and tissue donation are known they should be
honored, even if the next-of-kin disagrees).
58

Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992) (holding that frozen embryos were
different from other human tissue because of their potential to become persons).
59

Hecht v. Superior Court, 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 275 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that Kane
had a property interest in, and could therefore bequeath, his stored sperm to his partner,
Hecht).
60

The parties are listed in order of the probability with which their requests will be
granted, all things being equal.
61
Ethics Comm. of the Am. Soc’y for Reprod. Med., Posthumous Reprod., 82 FERTILITY
& STERILITY S260, S261 (2004).
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choice . . . is limited by the requirement that the partner must consent.”62 She thus
reached the conclusion that survivors do not have a constitutional liberty right to
make unilateral decisions about posthumous conception.63 Indeed, as evidenced by
divorce-related disputes, even where two parties consented to the use of their
gametes to create embryos, it is not at all clear that one of them could later make a
unilateral decision to use those embryos.64
It should, again as merely an aside, be noted that the survivor may potentially
assert a property right created by state law that would afford him or her some control
over the decedent’s gametes. States, for example, grant survivors who are next-ofkin the right to possess the decedent’s body for purposes of burial, donation, and the
prevention of mutilation.65 It is unlikely, however, that this would translate into a
right to order an invasive procedure such as posthumous gamete retrieval, or to
utilize previously frozen gametes without the decedent’s express consent. The
decedent might, however, pass previously frozen gametes to a survivor by will and
convey his or her consent to their use for conception.66 Further discussion of the
survivor’s potential property rights is beyond the scope of this essay.
Moving from the doctrinal to the practical, the technology enabling posthumous
conception has indisputably and irrevocably expanded individual liberty. Whether or
not there is any constitutional liberty right under existing due process doctrine, the
paucity of legal regulation surrounding reproductive technologies has conferred
substantial practical liberty on surviving spouses (and, in some cases, other
individuals) who wish to engage in posthumous conception—especially where the
decedent has clearly expressed his or her consent. Guidelines issued by the Ethics
Committee of the American Society for Reproductive Medicine provide that if the
decedent has consented to posthumous reproduction it is generally permissible for
doctors to enable posthumous conception.67
62

Katz, supra note 9, at 313.

63

Katz, supra note 9, at 313.

64

Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 588 (preventing an ex-wife from donating embryos against an exhusband’s wishes, but observing that “[t]he case would be closer if [the ex-wife] were seeking
to use the preembryos herself, but only if she could not achieve parenthood by any other
reasonable means”). For further discussion of these issues, see Kass v. Kass, 91 N.Y.2d 554
(1998) and A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051 (Mass. 2000).
65

See Brotherton v. Cleveland, 923F.2d 477 (6th Cir. 1991).

66

Hecht v. Sup. Ct., 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 275 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993).

67

Ethics Comm. of the Am. Soc’y for Reprod. Med., supra note 61, at S260–61. The
Ethics Committee stated:
If an individual designates the use of stored frozen gametes or embryos that can be
used for posthumous pregnancy, either for the use of a spouse or as a donation to
others, it would seem to be totally appropriate to honor this designation after their
death in the absence of any adverse consequences to the living participants in the
pregnancy or any expected children. The gestating woman and the rearing parent(s)
must be fully informed and in agreement with the process.
Ethics Comm. of the Am. Soc’y for Reprod. Med., supra note 61, at S261. If, however, the
decedent was silent or wished not to procreate posthumously, the ASRM prohibits doctors
from proceeding. The Ethics Committee stated:
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B. Equality Rights of Posthumously Conceived Children
Equality, like liberty, has both doctrinal and practical definitions, and this section
begins by focusing on its doctrinal definitions. To that end, it offers a brief overview
of cases involving discrimination against non-martial children and follows other
scholarship in arguing that the same principles applying in those cases ought to
apply in cases involving discrimination against posthumously conceived children.68
Turning to equality’s more practical definitions, this section concludes by observing
that when the legal system pronounces a posthumously conceived child a singleparent child it imposes dignitary harms and interferes with decisions that should be
reserved for the child and his or her family. The legal system, in sum, renders the
posthumously conceived child unequal.
The Equal Protection Clause, which prevents the government from “deny[ing] to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,” has been
interpreted as protecting children from discrimination based on the marital status of
their parents.69 Laws targeting non-marital children have historically received a form
of intermediate scrutiny70 and have been invalidated unless they were substantially
related to legitimate governmental interests.71 Such laws have raised suspicion
among the justices for a variety of reasons.72 First, non-marital status is never
volitional, since “no child is responsible for his birth and penalizing the illegitimate
child is ineffectual—as well as an unjust—way of deterring the parent.”73 Second,
non-marital status “bears no relation to the individual’s ability to participate in and
contribute to society.”74 And third, non-martial children have endured a long history

Programs are urged to insist that donors make their wishes known. If no decision on
disposition after death has been made, one would expect that in most instances this
would preclude any posthumous use. A request by a husband or wife for use of stored
gametes or embryos to override a prior denial of posthumous reproduction by the
deceased spouse should not be honored.
Ethics Comm. of the Am. Soc’y for Reprod. Med., supra note 61, at S261.
68

See Julie E. Goodwin, Not All Children Are Created Equal: A Proposal to Address
Equal Protection Inheritance Rights of Posthumously Conceived Children, 4 CONN. PUB. INT.
L.J. 234, 235 (2005) (“assert[ing] that state classifications that restrict the rights of
posthumously conceived children to inherit must satisfy intermediate scrutiny”).
69

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.

70

Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 505–06 (1976). Although Mathews does not expressly
apply intermediate scrutiny, later cases reference it as having applied intermediate scrutiny.
Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988) (citing Mathews after stating that discriminatory
classifications based on illegitimacy receive intermediate scrutiny).
71
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 441 (1985) (“[O]fficial
discriminations resting on [illegitimacy] are . . . subject to somewhat heightened review [and]
‘will survive equal protection scrutiny to the extent they are substantially related to a
legitimate state interest.’”) (citing Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 99 (1982)).
72
A concise and very useful overview of the law as it relates to non-martial children is
available in ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 933–34 (3d. ed. 2009).
73

Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972).

74

Mathews, 427 U.S. at 505.
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of discrimination that continues, albeit in less harsh forms, to the present.75 Their
long history of discrimination is evident from the fact that they were, at common
law, “filius nullius, or children of no one” and thus unable to inherit from either
parent through intestate succession.76 Continued discrimination is evident from the
fact that non-marital children must still take special steps to be able to inherit from
their fathers through intestate succession.77
Although these attributes of non-marital children have raised suspicion about
laws that target marital status, the Court has not been willing to apply strict scrutiny
to such laws—in part, because marital status is invisible and being a non-marital
child “does not carry an obvious badge.”78 In applying intermediate scrutiny, the
Court has been relatively consistent in invalidating laws that disadvantage all nonmartial children, but has varied in its view of laws that disadvantage only some
subset of non-martial children.79 This variance is illustrated by two cases decided in
the 1970s, both of which relate to the Social Security Act.
Jiminez v. Weinberger, decided in 1974, involved a claim by non-marital
children for disability benefits under the Social Security Act.80 Jiminez had three
children and, while the oldest was approved for benefits based on the fact that she
had been dependent on Jiminez prior to the onset of his disability, the younger two
were denied benefits because they had not been born until after the onset of his
disability.81 Even though all three children had lived with and been supported by
Jiminez their entire lives, only one was eligible for benefits as a dependent.82
Although other children born after the onset of a parent’s disability—i.e., all marital
children and those non-marital children who could inherit under state law, had been
legitimated under state law, or were “illegitimate only because of some formal defect
in their parents’ ceremonial marriage”83—were presumed dependent, Jiminez’s

75
Weber, 406 U.S. at 175(“The status of illegitimacy has expressed through the ages
society’s condemnation of irresponsible liaisons beyond the bonds of marriage.”).
76

Goodwin, supra note 68, at 241. By the 1700s, non-marital children were able to inherit
through intestate succession from their mothers, but it was not until recently (and with proof
of paternity) that they were able to inherit through intestate succession from their fathers.
Goodwin, supra note 68, at 241.
77

Lewis, supra note 10, at 36 (“Marital children only have to be born to have the right to
inherit. Whereas, in most states, non-marital children have to jump through legal hoops in
order to gain the right to inherit from their fathers.”); Richard F. Storrow, The Phantom
Children of the Republic: International Surrogacy and the New Illegitimacy, 20 AM. U. J.
GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 561, 577 (2012) (“Most states have passed laws allowing nonmarital
children to inherit from their mothers, but, by and large, nonmarital children still face legal
obstacles to inheriting from their fathers.”).
78

Mathews, 427 U.S. at 506.

79

CHEMERINSKY, supra note 72, at 934.

80

Jiminez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974).

81

Id. at 630–31.

82

Id.

83

Id. at 634–36. The full list of non-marital children who could receive benefits was as
follows: those “(a) who can inherit under state intestacy laws, or (b) who are legitimated under
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younger two children were denied not only the presumption of dependency but also
the opportunity to prove actual dependency.84 The Court, in holding the
discrimination between two subsets of non-marital children unconstitutional,
observed that the Act was both over-inclusive (in allowing some non-marital
children to receive benefits based on an incorrect presumption of dependency) and
under-inclusive (in preventing other non-marital children from receiving benefits
despite their actual dependency).85 Ultimately, the Court promoted the primary
purpose of the provision at issue, which was “to provide support for dependents of a
disabled wage earner.”86
Mathews v. Lucas involved a claim for Social Security survivors benefits by the
non-marital children of a deceased insured wage earner.87 Under the Social Security
Act, all marital children and some non-marital children—those who were presumed
dependent based on, for example, their ability to inherit under state intestacy law and
those who could prove actual dependency at the time of death—were entitled to
benefits, while others were not.88 Robert Cuffee’s two children were neither
presumptively nor actually dependent on him at the time of his death, and were thus
denied benefits.89 They challenged the denial, but the Court rejected their challenge
because the provision at issue was meant to provide for dependents and the
presumptions of dependency were “reasonably related to the likelihood of
dependency.”90 Although some children who were similarly situated—in that they
were not actually dependent on their parent at the time of his death—would receive
benefits based on their presumptive dependency while the Cuffee children would
not, the Court found no equal protection violation.91
state law, or (c) who are illegitimate only because of some formal defect in their parents'
ceremonial marriage.” Id. at 635–36.
84

Id. at 634–35.

85

Id. at 637.

86

Id. at 634.

87

Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 495 (1976).

88

Id. at 498–99, 502. While the law is slightly more complicated than the textual sentence
suggests, the additional nuances do not provide much more clarity. The Court wrote, in full,
Unless the child has been adopted by some other individual, a child who is legitimate,
or a child who would be entitled to inherit personal property from the insured parent's
estate under the applicable state intestacy law, is considered to have been dependent at
the time of the parent's death. Even lacking this relationship under state law, a child,
unless adopted by some other individual, is entitled to a presumption of dependency if
the decedent, before death, (a) had gone through a marriage ceremony with the other
parent, resulting in a purported marriage between them which, but for a nonobvious
legal defect, would have been valid, or (b) in writing had acknowledged the child to
be his, or (c) had been decreed by a court to be the child's father, or (d) had been
ordered by a court to support the child because the child was his.
Id.
89

Id. at 500–01.

90

Id. at 509.

91

Id. at 495–523.
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Others, including Julie Goodwin (whose work this section draws upon), have
considered how the above doctrine might apply to posthumously conceived children.
One must begin the discussion by observing that posthumously conceived children
are, in fact, a subset of non-marital children.92 As the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts explained, “[b]ecause death ends a marriage, posthumously conceived
children are always non-marital children.”93 Conception status (i.e., posthumous or
non-posthumous) also shares several of the features of marital status.94 First, like
marital status, it is never volitional, since “no child is responsible for his birth.”95
Second, like marital status, it “bears no relation to the individual’s ability to
participate in and contribute to society.”96 And third, while non-marital children may
have endured a longer history of discrimination than posthumously conceived
children this is at least in part because posthumous conception was not
technologically possible for most of our nation’s history.97 Furthermore, it is clear
that posthumously conceived children have experienced and continue to experience
discrimination, both social and legal.98 In some states—such as Florida, where the
Capato case occurred—posthumously conceived children are, as previously
discussed, barred from taking through intestate succession.99
The Capato Court, however, neither viewed posthumously conceived children as
a subset of non-marital children nor recognized them as similar to non-marital
children and thus applied only rational basis review.100 While acknowledging that
classifications disadvantaging non-marital children are quasi-suspect, in part because
of the unfairness of punishing children for the acts of their parents,101 the Capato
Court held that “posthumously conceived children [have not been shown to] share
the characteristics that prompted our skepticism of classifications disadvantaging

92
Goodwin, supra note 68 (citing Woodward v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 760 N.E.2d at 266–
67 (Mass. 2002)).
93

Woodward v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 760 N.E.2d 257, 266–67 (Mass. 2002)(“Because
death ends a marriage, see Callow v. Thomas, 322 Mass. 550, 55 78 N.E.2d 637 (1948);
Rawson v. Rawson, 156 Mass. 578, 580 31 N.E. 653 (1892), posthumously conceived children
are always nonmarital children.”).
94

See also Goodwin, supra note 68.
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Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972).
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Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 505 (1976).
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Goodwin, supra note 68, at 241.
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Goodwin, supra note 68, at 272–73.
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FLA. STAT. § 742.17(4) (2013); see Goodwin, supra note 69, at 241. While
posthumously conceived children may be unable to inherit through intestate succession, most
states allow children born either before or within 300 days of a parent’s death to inherit
through instate succession. Goodwin, supra note 69, at 241.
100
Astrue v. Capato, 132 S. Ct. 2021, 2033 (2012). It should be noted that the court did not
definitively decide whether heightened scrutiny would be appropriate if, in a future case,
posthumously conceived children were shown to share the characteristics that render nonmarital children a quasi-suspect class. Id.
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Id. (citing Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988)).

2014]

LIBERTY, EQUALITY, AND PARENTAGE

23

[non-marital] children.”102 This suggests that, at least for the moment, laws targeting
posthumously conceived children are likely to receive only rational basis review.
Even if the Court had applied heightened scrutiny in Capato, however, the provision
at issue might have survived, since the Court viewed its purpose as providing
“dependent members of [a wage earner’s] family with protection against . . . [the]
loss of [the insured’s] earnings.”103 Although some posthumously conceived
children—e.g., those entitled to inherit under state intestacy law—would receive
benefits, no posthumously conceived child would be able to illustrate loss in the
sense of dependency at the time of their parent’s death.
Turning to equality’s more practical definitions, limiting the law’s reliance on
parent-child relationships as a proxy for provider-dependent relationships could
mitigate the inequality experienced by posthumously conceived children. When the
legal system pronounces a posthumously conceived child a single-parent child it
imposes dignitary harms and interferes with decisions that should be reserved for
private actors. Rather than determining whether a deceased gamete-provider is a
parent, the law ought to leave that decision to the child and his or her family. The
term parent carries substantial symbolic weight and should not be legally imposed or
withheld in this context. Instead, the law should focus on the concrete incidents of
parentage, such as being a financial provider.
IV. DIMINISHING THE LAW’S FOCUS ON PARENTAGE
Part IV argues that the inequality experienced by posthumously conceived
children could be at least partly mitigated by shifting the law’s focus away from
parent-child relationships and toward provider-dependent relationships. It
specifically argues that we ought to eliminate the use of parentage as a proxy for
dependency and, in turn, as a path to survivors benefits. This would, in cases like
Capato, allow legal entities to identify provider-dependent relationships and allocate
benefits without making any pronouncements about parent-child relationships. Part
IV(A) discusses how we might eliminate the use of parent-child relationships from
the Social Security Act, and Part IV(B) discusses how we might then allocate
benefits.
A. From Parents and Children to Providers and Dependents
Parent-child relationships are often used as proxies for provider-dependent
relationships and, thus, as one path to governmental benefits.104 Under the Social
Security Act, children are generally viewed as the dependents of their legal
parents.105 Section 402(3)(A) provides, “A child shall be deemed dependent upon his
father [or mother] unless, at [the time of death, the father or mother] was not living
with or contributing to the support of [the] child and [the] child is [not the father’s or
mother’s] legitimate child.”106 While the cases discussed above speak to some of the
102

Id.

103

Id. at 2032. The Court went on to discuss the Ninth Circuit’s holding that the “regime is
‘reasonably related to the government's twin interests in [reserving] benefits [for] those
children who have lost a parent's support.’” Id. at 2033.
104

See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(3)(A) (2013).

105

Id.

106

Id.
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intricacies of the Social Security Act’s provisions, it suffices for purposes of this Part
to say that being the “child” of a deceased insured wage earner is in many cases the
key to being deemed a “dependent” and, thus, to receiving benefits.
Inasmuch as the Social Security Act is designed to provide benefits for the
dependents of deceased insured wage earners,107 there is no reason other than
administrative convenience to use parent-child relationships as a proxy for providerdependent relationships. And, it should be emphasized, the administrative
convenience of allowing parental status to determine provider status is outweighed
by the very real costs it imposes on children. It results, for example, in some
posthumously conceived children who have only one provider unnecessarily being
told they also have only one parent.108
While “parent” may at first blush seem to be a useful category, little effort is
required to illustrate that it is a highly unstable category—even outside the unique
context of posthumous conception.109 There are, as Professor Susan Appleton
observes in her article titled Parents by the Numbers, many kinds of parents110—one
might, for example, identify birth parents, genetic parents, intended parents, adoptive
parents, de facto parents, and psychological parents.111 And, there are at least three
common ways of defining what it means to be a legal “parent.” One might focus on
genetics, on intent, or on actual parental conduct.112
As applied to posthumous conception, a deceased gamete-provider’s
parental status varies depending on whether one focuses on genetics, intent, or
parental conduct. If one focuses on genetics, the deceased gamete-provider is always
a parent; if one focuses on intent, he may in some cases be a parent; and, if one
focuses on parental conduct, he will never be a parent. With respect to parental
conduct, as Part III(A) discussed, deceased individuals can neither enjoy the rights
nor carry out the responsibilities of parenthood. As Professor Robertson (whose
107

Capato, 132 S.Ct. at 2032, (citing Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47, 52 (1977)); see also
42 U.S.C. § 402(1)(C) (2013) (providing that every “child” who is “dependent” upon a
deceased insured wage earner is entitled to benefits). This is not the only purpose of the Act;
the Act provides others with benefits as well. 42 U.S.C. § 402(1)(C) (2013).
108

It should be noted that, although it is not the focus of this essay, allowing parental status
to determine provider status may also result in some children who had two providers being
denied benefits on the grounds that only one of those providers was a parent.
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There is a vast body of scholarship on the law of parentage. Important recent
contributions include Susan Frelich Appleton, supra note 7, at 25–26; Julie Shapiro, Counting
from One: Replacing the Marital Presumption with a Presumption of Sole Parentage, 20 AM.
U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 509 (2012); Katharine K. Baker, Bionormativity and the
Construction of Parenthood, 42 GA. L. REV. 649, 655 (2008); Melanie B. Jacobs, My Two
Dads: Disaggregating Biological and Social Paternity, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 809, 851–52 (2006);
Laura T. Kessler, Community Parenting, 24 WASH. U. J.L. & Pol'y 47, 49 (2007).
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Deborah H. Wald, The Parentage Puzzle: The Interplay Between Genetics, Procreative
Intent, and Parental Conduct in Determining Legal Parentage, 15 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC.
POL’Y & L. 379, 381 (2007) (“As our courts and legislatures grapple with [determining
parentage], the primary factors they have considered are procreative intent, genetics, the
marital presumption, and parental conduct.”).
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work on this topic is discussed in Part III(A)) explained, “[o]rdinarily, reproduction
is valued because of the genetic, gestational, and rearing experiences involved.”113
Yet, individuals whose gametes are used posthumously “will not gestate [or] rear [,
and a]t most, [will experience only] the present satisfaction of knowing that genetic
reproduction might occur after [they have] died.”114 Conversely, they will “not
experience anxiety about the welfare of their offspring or the fear that a person will
knock on their door claiming to be their child.”115 He concludes, “[a]t most, they will
have the certainty that no children will be born after they die and they are no longer
around to see, rear, or worry about them.”116
Many scholars have recognized the difficulty in relying exclusively on genetics,
intent, or parental conduct to determine parenthood,117 and one way of alleviating the
difficulty is to avoid it altogether by eliminating the determination of parenthood
wherever possible. The law could alternatively focus on identifying the individuals
who fill the specific roles traditionally associated with parenthood, such as the role
of financial provider. Professor Appleton has, for example, explored the idea of
“decoupl[ing] parental status from [the associated] financial obligations,”118 and has
argued that the bundle of rights and responsibilities that has historically flowed from
parenthood has, in some ways, already been unbound.119 Eliminating the focus on
parental status in favor of a focus on provider status would reserve the decision of
whether to view a deceased gamete provider as a parent for the posthumously
conceived child and his or her family. This would not only prevent the government
from unnecessary intervention, but also protect the child from the confusion that
could result if the family reached a different conclusion than the government.
On a practical level, one could easily determine whether a deceased gamete
provider should be viewed as a financial provider who was capable of transmitting
survivors benefits without determining whether he or she was the child’s parent. One
could conclude that deceased gamete providers are never financial providers, since
even if they pass property to their posthumously conceived children they cannot
make subsequent financial provisions. Or, one could conclude that deceased gamete
providers may be financial providers in a narrow set of circumstances—for example,
where they have passed property by will to their posthumously conceived children.
While there may be other alternatives, the key point is that it is possible to sever the
determination of parental status from the determination of provider status with the
goal of reserving the former for the posthumously conceived child and his or her
family.
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Robertson, supra note 52, at 1031.
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Robertson, supra note 52, at 1031–32.
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Pamela Laufer-Ukeles, Mothering for Money: Regulating Commercial Intimacy, 88
IND. L.J. 1223, 1258 (2013) (“[I]ntent, genetics, gestation, and functional care all matter in
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Inquiries into provider status rather than parental status are, thus, both possible
and preferable. It should be noted that, as will be discussed in Part IV(B), such
inquiries could also, if applied uniformly, result in some children receiving benefits
through individuals to whom they have no legal relationship under the current
system. Such a system could more accurately reflect the reality of children’s lives
and more justly effectuate the purpose of the Social Security Act, which is to provide
for the dependents of deceased insured wage earners.120
While proposing to diminish the use of parentage may seem radical, it is not
entirely novel. Several scholars have recently questioned the law’s focus on
parentage. Professor Melissa Murray has explored the possibility of “dismantling
parenthood altogether as a legal category.”121 While she urges caution—in part,
because the concept of the legal parent is so pervasive122—her work illustrates that
the law’s assumptions about legal parents are often not well aligned with the realities
of parenting. The law, for example, assumes that parents are their children’s primary
caregivers, while in reality “parents routinely rely on [others] to help them discharge
their caregiving responsibilities.”123 Professor Susan Appleton has relatedly
challenged “parenthood’s supposed indivisibility” and argued that “family law
already routinely practices disaggregation of parental rights and responsibilities.”124
States, as Professor Appleton points out, already have elaborate rules for dividing the
incidents of parentage upon divorce.125 Courts regularly dictate who will receive
physical custody, who will receive legal custody, and who will provide financial
support.126 Allowing legal entities to make more nuanced determinations provides a
host of benefits, from promoting the just allocation of benefits to allowing families
to make their own decisions about who will take on the mantle of parenthood.
B. Allocating Benefits in a Less Parent-Focused Regime
If, as Part IV(A) urges, we shifted our focus away from parent-child relationships
to vitiate the status inequality that posthumously conceived children experience, the
question of which children should receive survivors benefits would remain. Karen
Capato said in an interview that her case was “not about the money,”127 but one can
assume that money was at least a relevant consideration—or that it would be for
other litigants. There are multiple options for going forward under a less parentfocused regime, and this section will sketch the outlines of one possibility.
120
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If the goal were to maintain the existing system largely intact, one could simply
allocate survivors benefits to those children who had actually received support from
a deceased insured wage earner during his or her lifetime. Such a system would not,
of course, have changed the result for Karen Capato’s twins. They did not receive
support from Robert Capato during his lifetime and they would not receive benefits
under this new system. Furthermore, such a system would change the results
unfavorably for some posthumously conceived children. Those who live in states
with intestacy laws allowing them to inherit from their deceased genetic parents
would receive benefits under the existing system, but would not receive benefits
under this new system.
There would be, however, three important benefits to this new system. First, it
would treat all posthumously conceived children equally—despite the fact that
equality would take the form of a blanket denial of survivors benefits. Second, it
would treat posthumously conceived children and non-posthumously conceived
children equally, because it would hold them all to the same standard. Under the new
standard, it should be noted that benefits would be awarded to some previously
ineligible children—i.e., those who had been receiving support from a non-parent.128
Third and finally, this new system would prevent the government from making
unnecessary pronouncements about parentage. Rather than dictating whether a given
deceased insured wage earner was a parent, administrators would simply determine
whether he or she had been a provider. While identifying actual providers rather than
using parentage as a proxy would of course impose new burdens (on, for example,
administrators), such burdens would be far outweighed by the benefits that would be
conferred on society as a whole. While there are other more radical alternatives—
such as, for example, dismantling survivors benefits in favor of a program that
would benefit all children by decoupling child support entirely from previous
provider support—they are beyond the scope of this essay.
V. CONCLUSION
Part V concludes that, if we focused less on parental status and more on provider
status we could protect the liberty of adults, promote the equality of children, and
perhaps achieve a more just distribution of governmental benefits. Removing the
requirement of a parent-child relationship from the Social Security Act would have
positive consequences for both adult’s procreative liberty and children’s equality. It
would protect adult’s procreative liberty in the sense that prospective parents would
not have to worry that electing posthumous conception would adversely affect their
children. It would promote children’s equality by removing any harm that might
flow from the disconnect between their mother’s view of their parentage and the
law’s view of their parentage. It would, furthermore, be consistent with recent
proposals to rethink the law’s focus on parentage.
As previously mentioned, Karen Capato said in an interview that her case was
“not about the money.”129 Part of what it was likely about, however, was whether her
128
These children would have been denied benefits under the old system because they were
not “children” of a deceased insured wage earner, but they would be awarded benefits under
this new system. Astrue v. Capato, 132 S. Ct. 2021, 2028 (2012). The Capato Court noted that
the Act’s purpose was to reserve benefits for “those children who have lost a parent’s
support.” Id. This proposal would give benefits to any children who had lost a provider’s
support. Id.
129

See Henderson, supra note 127.
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deceased husband was the legal parent of her children. This essay would reform the
law such that survivors benefits could be allocated without any determination of
legal parentage. This would give prospective parents in Karen Capato’s situation the
liberty to make decisions about posthumous conception without fear of imposing
legal inequality on their children. It would also enable the resulting children and
their families to make their own decisions about whether to view the deceased
gamete provider as a parent. Understood more broadly, this idea of unbinding the
term “parent” from the historically associated rights and responsibilities could
promote liberty as well as equality and ultimately enable courts to make more
nuanced determinations about the rights and responsibilities associated with
childrearing.

